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I. INTRODUCTION 
When a woman is raped1 she experiences severe physical and emo-
tional traumas from both the assault and the events that follow. The 
attack itself is a brutal and terrifying personal violation that can have a 
long term if not permanent impact on the victim's life.2 The victim also 
suffers the extremely difficult ordeal of disclosing the nature and specifics 
of the crime to law enforcement officers. If the assailant is caught, the 
victim will likely be asked to testify in a public trial about the crime 
committed against her, again subjecting her to emotional pain. Through-
out this period the woman is trying to regain a sense of control and 
autonomy in her daily living situation. Compounding these and other 
difficulties, some women are being further victimized by having their 
identities widely disseminated by newspapers and television stations. 
• ©Paul Marcus and Tara L. McMahon, 1990. 
•• Professor of Law, University of Arizona. 
••• Assistant Washington Counsel, Health Insurance Association of America. We thank 
Charles Ares, Barbara Atwood, Robert Glennon, Toni Massaro and Rodney Smolla for their 
thoughtful comments on an earlier draft of this article. The support of Dean E. Thomas Sullivan 
and the University of Arizona Law College Association is acknowledged with gratitude. 
1. While certainly men are also the victims of sexual assaults, criminal justice statistics indi· 
cate that women are the overwhelming majority of victims of such crimes, with reported cases hav· 
ing 10-15 times more women as victims than men. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK OF 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS 164 (1986). 
2. See Becker, Skiuner, Abel, Howell & Bruce, The Effects of Sexual Assault on Rape and 
Attempted Rape Victims, 7 VICTIMOLOGY ANN. 106 (1982); Burgess & Holmstrom, Rape Trauma 
Syndrome, 131 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 981 (1974); Ellis, Atkeson & Calhoun, Short Reports: An Assess-
ment of Long-Term Reaction to Rape, 90 J. ABNORMAL PSYCHOLOGY 263 (1981); Feldman-Sum· 
mers, Gordon & Meagher, The Impact of Rape on Sexual Satisfaction, 88 J. ABNORMAL 
PSYCHOLOGY 101 (1979); Frank, Turner & Duffy, Depressive Symptoms in Rape Victims, 1 J. 
AFFECTIVE DISORDERS 269 (1979); Kilpatrick, Veronen & Resick, The Aftermath of Rape: Recent 
Empirical Findings, 49 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 658 (1979); Massaro, Experts, Psychology, Credi· 
bility, and Rape: The Rape Trauma Syndrome Issue and Its Implications for Expert Psychological 
Testimony, 69 MINN. L. REv. 395, 424-32 (1985); Resick, Calhoun, Atkeson & Ellis, Social Adjust· 
ment in Victims of Sexual Assault, 49 J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGY 705 (1981); Suther· 
land & Scher}, Patterns of Response Among Victims of Rape, 40 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 503 
(1970). 
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While fortunately the phenomenon is not prevalent, if disclosure occurs 
prior to trial it can be one of the more cruel aspects of this traumatic 
experience. 3 
In two important cases the Supreme Court attempted to balance the 
important privacy concerns of the sexual assault victim against the legiti-
mate interests of the news media in reporting newsworthy events. In Cox 
Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn 4 the Court overwhelmingly supported the 
views of the media over those seeking penalties for the disclosure of the 
victims' identities. Recently, however, in Florida Star v. B.J.F. 5 a major-
ity of the Court retreated from its earlier strong language and left open 
the distinct possibility of valid state sanctions against those who disclose 
the names of sexual assault victims prior to trial. 
In this article we will analyze the Court's opinions in Cox Broad-
casting Corp. v. Cohn and Florida Star v. B.J.F. and the related first 
amendment and privacy issues. In addition, we will review the state 
interests involved in limiting disclo~ure of the victim's identity. It is our 
view that the disclosure of rape victims' identities should be limited and 
states should adopt narrowly and carefully written statutes designed to 
promote the interests of both the media and the victims of these crimes. 
We believe such statutes would survive constitutional scrutiny and would 
not unduly interfere with the legitimate concerns of the media in report-
ing newsworthy events. Moreover, they could provide true protection to 
the victims ofbrutal sexual offenses. We conclude the article with a pro-
posed comprehensive statute. 
3. Trial disclosure is fairly common because the trials are open to the public at large. The 
discussion here is limited to pretrial matters principally because of our particular concern with dis-
closure just after the commission of the crime when the victim may be most emotionally vulnerable 
and when the assailant may still be at large. Moreover, at trial the judge may be able to take special 
precautions to limit the impact on the victim. See infra note 152 and accompanying text. Most 
media organizations prohibit disclosure prior to trial of the names of victims of crime. That clearly 
was the rule in Florida Star v. B.J.F. See infra text accompanying note 22. But see infra note 128 
(discussing the problems that arise in the detailed reporting of the crime with only the victim's name 
being withheld). Moreover, some continue to argue that records of rapes must be kept open and that 
the public should be advised of all important facts, including the identity of the victim, even prior to 
trial. See Worthington, Identifying Rape Victims Sparks Row, Chi. Tribune, July 29, 1990, § 1, at 
15, zone C. (Geneva Overholser, editor of the Des Moines Register, for example, has repeatedly 
argued that rape victims names should be published.). 
4. 420 u.s. 469 (1975). 
5. 491 u.s. 524 (1989). 
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II. COX BROADCASTING CORP. v. COHN 
The plaintiff was the father of a young woman who had been raped 
and murdered by six criminal defendants. Both the incident and the 
court proceedings were widely reported, though the identity of the 
daughter was not disclosed prior to trial. At the time of the hearing on 
the motion to accept guilty pleas, a television station identified the victim 
in a news report discussing the court proceedings. The identification vio-
lated a state criminal statute which prohibited the identification of a rape 
victim.6 The victim's family sued the station under a common law the-
ory of public disclosure of private facts. The Georgia courts allowed a 
substantial judgment to be entered against the media defendant. 7 
In both state and federal courts the media defendant essentially 
raised two defenses. The first was that the defendant learned the name of 
the victim from a review of the indictments available for public inspec-
tion in a courtroom. The second was that the public's right·to know of 
newsworthy events under the first amendment absolutely protected the 
disclosure of the name of the victim of the crime. Responding to both 
arguments, the Georgia Supreme Court found for the plaintiff. The 
court's opinion conceded a strong public interest in the reporting of crim-
inal proceedings; however, it concluded that there could be "no public 
interest or general concern about the identity of the victim of such a 
crime as will make the right to disclose the identity of the victim rise to 
the level of First Amendment protection.''8 
In a strongly worded opinion by Justice White, the United States 
Supreme Court resolved the matter wholly in favor of the media defend-
ant. For the Court the question was "whether the State may impose 
sanctions on the accurate publication of the name of a rape victim 
obtained from public records-more specifically, from judicial records 
which are maintained in connection with a public prosecution and which 
themselves are open to public inspection."9 A few factors were essential 
to the Court's analysis. The opinion emphasized the important role of 
the media in reporting criminal trial proceedings: 
6. Cox Broadcasting, 420 U.S. at 471-72 & n.l. 
7. The trial court had found that the criminal statute impliedly created a civil remedy for the 
plaintiff. The Georgia Supreme Court held instead that the plaintiff's action was based on the state 
common Jaw tort of public disclosure of private facts. Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 231 Ga. 60, 
61-62, 200 S.E.2d 127, 129-30 (1973), rev'd, 420 U.S. 469 (1975). 
8. Id. at 68, 200 S.E.2d at 134. 
9. Cox Broadcasting, 420 U.S. at 491. 
1991] LIMITING DISCLOSURE 
With respect to judicial proceedings in particular, the function of the 
press serves to guarantee the fairness of trials . . . . 
1023 
... The commission of crime, prosecutions resulting from it, and 
judicial proceedings arising from the prosecutions . . . are without 
question events of legitimate concern to the public and consequently 
fall within the responsibility of the press to report the operations of 
govemment.10 
Moreover, in this case Georgia allowed members of the media to receive 
information regarding the identity of victims of sexual assaults by mak-
ing such information readily available to reporters. This fact became 
determinative. "Once true information is disclosed in public court docu-
ments open to public inspection, the press cannot be sanctioned for pub-
lishing it. In this instance as in others reliance must rest upon the 
judgment of those who decide what to publish or broadcast."11 
Several related cases came to the Supreme Court soon after its deci-
sion in Cox Broadcasting. 12 Of paramount importance was the decision 
in Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co. 13 concerning a West Virginia crim-
inal statute that prohibited the publication of the name of any child pros-
ecuted in a juvenile criminal action. The media defendant learned of a 
serious shooting incident, obtained the name of the juvenile assailant by 
speaking to witnesses, and published a story in the newspaper about the 
shooting, revealing the juvenile's name and picture. Though a strong 
argument was made for the need to protect confidentiality in the juvenile 
process, 14 the Court refused to recognize "the power of a state to punish 
the truthful publication of an alleged juvenile delinquent's name lawfully 
obtained by a newspaper."15 The state was unable to demonstrate that 
its action was necessary to further the hnportant governmental interest 
10. /d. at 492. 
11. /d. at 496. 
12. See, e.g., Landmark Communications v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829 (1978) (reversing the con-
viction of a newspaper that accurately reported pending judicial review of commission proceedings); 
Oklahoma Publishing Co. v. District Court, 430 U.S. 308 (1977) (striking down a state judge's pre-
trial order prohibiting the media from publishing the name of an 11-year-o1d boy in connection with 
a juvenile proceeding where reporters had been present). 
13. 443 u.s. 97 (1979). 
14. Justice Rehnquist, in concurrence, emphasized that "publicity may have a harmful impact 
on the rehabilitation of a juvenile offender." /d. at 108 n.l (Rehnquist, J., concurring). He believed 
that limitation of disclosure was appropriate and necessary: "[A] State's interest in preserving the 
anonymity of its juvenile offenders-an interest that I consider to be, in the words of the Court, of 
the 'highest order'-far outweighs any minimal interference with freedom of the press that a ban on 
publication of the youths' names entails." /d. at 107. 
15. Daily Mail, 443 U.S. at 105-06. 
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involved, particularly when forty-five other states had confidentiality 
requirements in connection with juvenile proceedings, yet did not have 
criminal sanctions. 16 
The Daily Mail holding became less important than the test it estab-
lished to resolve conflicting interests in the disclosure of individuals' 
names, whether juvenile offenders as in Daily Mail or rape victims as in 
Florida Star. The test was simply stated by Chief Justice Burger: "[I]f a 
newspaper lawfully obtains truthful information about a matter of public 
significance then state officials may not constitutionally punish publica-
tion of the information, absent a need to further a state interest of the 
highest order.'m 
In any analysis involving appropriate state responses to the disclo-
sure of crime victims' names, the Daily Mail formulation requires the 
answers to two questions: Is the state's interest of the highest order, and 
is the action necessary to further that state interest? 
Ill. FLORIDA STAR v. B.J.F. 
Fourteen years after its decision in Cox Broadcasting, the Supreme 
Court's opinion in Florida Star v. B.J.F. undoubtedly came as a surprise 
to many. The surprise was not in the ultimate disposition of the case, a 
finding for the media defendant, but rather was in the narrow holding of 
the Court and the rather cautious language found throughout the major-
ity opinion of Justice Marshall. 18 Indeed, early in the opinion the Court 
stated that even though all earlier opinions had upheld the press's right 
to publish, "we have emphasized each time that we were resolving this 
conflict ouly as it arose in a discrete factual context.'' 19 
The state of Florida, seemingly heeding the language in Cox Broad-
casting,20 passed a law making it illegal to "print, publish, or broadcast 
16. Id. at 105. 
17. Id. at 103. 
18. The Court noted the very different approach followed in the defamation area: "The some-
what uncharted state of the law in this area thus contrasts markedly with the well-mapped area of 
defamatory falsehoods, where a long line of decisions has produced relatively detailed legal stan-
dards governing the multifarious situations in which individuals aggrieved by the dissemination of 
damaging untrnths seck redress." Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 530 n.5 (1989). 
19. Id. at 530. 
20. Justice White, the author of the Cox Broadcasting opinion, was especially concerned with 
the Court's rejection of the Florida statute. "Florida has done precisely what we suggested, in Cox 
Broadcasting, that States wishing to protect the privacy rights of rape victims might do: 'respond [to 
the challenge] by means which avoid public documentation or other exposure of private informa-
tion.' " Id. at 547 (White, J., dissenting) (quoting Cox Broadcasting, 420 U.S. at 496) (emphasis 
added by Justice White in his Florida Star dissent). 
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... in any instrument of mass communication" the name of the victim of 
a sexual assault. 21 Pursuant to this statute, the victim of a sexual assault 
brought an action against a weekly newspaper that had published a 
description of the assault committed against her and also specifically 
identified her. The reporter for the newspaper received this information 
from an investigative report in the sheriff's department press room. The 
printing of the victim's name also violated the newspaper's own internal 
policy of not publishing the names of victims of sexual offenses. 22 
At trial the plaintiff testified that she suffered greatly from the publi-
cation of her identity. She was questioned by her co-workers, received 
harassing phone calls, required mental health counseling, was forced to 
move from her home and seek police protection, and was even threatened 
with being raped again. The trial judge found that the newspaper's 
actions constituted negligence per se, so that ultimately the ouly issue left 
for the jury was determination of damages. The plaintiff received 
$75,000 in compensatory damages and $25,000 in punitive damages.23 
In response to the newspaper's broad arguments that these court actions 
violated the first amendment, the Florida court looked to the suffering 
endured by the rape victim and concluded that her name was "of a pri-
vate nature and not to be published as a matter of law."24 
Justice Marshall began his opinion by remarking that the central 
issue involved in Florida Star had recurred over the past two decades and 
had never been fully resolved by the Court: 
The tension between the right which the First Amendment 
accords to a free press, on the one hand, and the protections which 
various statutes and common-law doctrines accord to personal privacy 
against the publication of truthful information, on the other, is a sub-
ject we have addressed several times in recent years.25 
21. FLA. STAT. § 794.03 (1987). 
22. Florida Star, 491 U.S. at 528. 
23. The punitive damages award in this case appeared to be of special concern to all of the 
Justices, though it was not substantively analyzed because of the holding of the Court. Justice Mar-
shall's stated: "Having concluded that imposing liability on appellant pursuant to § 794.03 violates 
the First Amendment, we have no occasion to address appellant's subsidiary arguments that the 
imposition of punitive damages for publication independently violated the First Amendment .... " 
Id. at 540 n.9. 
Justice White also made reference to this point: "The Court does not address the distinct con-
stitutional questions raised by the award of punitive damages in this case .... Consequently, I do 
not do so either. That award is more troublesome than the compensatory award discussed above." 
Id. at 553 n.5 (White, J., dissenting). 
24. Florida Star v. B.J.F., 499 So. 2d 883, 884 (Fla. 1986), rev'd, 491 U.S. 524 (1989). 
25. Florida Star, 109 S. Ct. at 530. 
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The Court resisted the parties' call for a broad rule. The publisher 
claimed the first amendment mandated "that the press may never be 
punished, civilly or criminally, for publishing the truth."26 The plaintiff, 
on the other hand, espoused the "categorical rule that publication of the 
name of a rape victim never enjoys constitutional protection.'m In sup-
port of these propositions each of the parties strongly emphasized Cox 
Broadcasting. 28 Justice Marshall, however, quickly distinguished Cox 
Broadcasting and refused to rely heavily on its holding. He noted that 
while there was some resemblance to Cox Broadcasting, that case 
involved a very different principle because the name of the rape victim 
had been obtained from courthouse records open to public inspection, a 
fact that the Court in Cox Broadcasting repeatedly noted. 29 In the 
instant case, however, the press's role in subjecting trials to public scru-
tiny, emphasized in Cox Broadcasting, "is not directly compromised 
where, as here, the information in question comes from a police report 
prepared and disseminated at a time at which not only had no adversarial 
criminal proceedings begun, but no suspect had been identified."30 
The majority chose to take a narrow view, stating, "We continue to 
believe that the sensitivity and significance of the interests presented in 
clashes between First Amendment and privacy rights counsel relying on 
limited principles that sweep no more broadly than the appropriate con-
text of the instant case."31 The controlling case for the majority was not 
Cox Broadcasting, but Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co. 32 The Court 
concluded that the correct rule, formulated in Daily Mail, is that "[[i]]f a 
newspaper lawfully obtains truthful information about a matter of public 
significance then state officials may not constitutionally punish publica-
tion of the information, absent a need to further a state interest of the 
highest order.'' 33 
Justice Marshall's opinion gave several reasons for relying on this 
rule. Preliminarily, the Court wrote that under the rule the states retain 
26. Id. at 531. 
27. Id at 531-32. 
28. Id. Justice White in his dissent strongly disagreed with the parties as to the impact of the 
Cox Broadcasting case. He repeatedly emphasized that disclosure in Cox Broadcasting came about 
in connection with fully open judicial proceedings and that the holding in the case simply was "that 
the State cannot make the press its first line of defense in withholding private information from the 
public-it cannot ask the press to secrete private facts that the State makes no effort to safeguard in 
the first place." ld. at 544 (White, J., dissenting). 
29. Florida Star, 491 U.S. at 532. 
30. ld. 
31. Id. at 533. 
32. 443 u.s. 97 (1979). 
33. Florida Star, 491 U.S. at 533 (quoting Daily Mail, 443 U.S. at 103). 
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substantial means for safeguarding their interests because the rule deals 
only with situations in which the media defendant has lawfully obtained 
the information. 34 Also, if the government had chosen to make the infor-
mation publicly available, a prohibition of media coverage would be "rel-
atively unlikely to advance the interests in the service of which the State 
seeks to act."35 Finally, the Court believed that the Daily Mail test 
struck a proper balance because anything less protective of the first 
amendment interest would result in "timidity and self-censorship" 36 on 
the part of reporters and publishers. This would be particularly trouble-
some, wrote Justice Marshall, because news articles such as the one in 
Florida Star concerned matters of "public significance" as they described 
for the public the commission and investigation of violent crimes. 37 
Conceding that the state's interest in this case was of the highest 
order,38 the Court nevertheless struck down the Florida action. Justice 
Marshall gave three reasons for finding the Florida action inappropriate 
under the first amendment. The first focused on the manner in which the 
newspaper had obtained the information. Because the government had 
given the information freely to the press in a situation that was open to 
the public, the state's policy against disclosure of rape victims' identities 
had been "undercut." "Where, as here, the government has failed 
to police itself in disseminating information, it is clear ... that the impo-
sition of damages against the press for its subsequent publication can 
hardly be said to be a narrowly tailored means of safeguarding 
anonymity ."39 
The second reason was based on the Court's difficulties with Flor-
ida's particular civil cause of action. There was no apparent requirement 
that the jury find "that the disclosure of a fact about a pe~on's private 
34. I d. at 534. The Court made clear that none of these cases resolved the issue of government 
sanctions when truthful information was published by a newspaper that had acquired that informa-
tion unlawfully. ld. at 535 n.8. 
35. Id. at 535. 
36. Id. (quoting Cox Broadcasting, 420 U.S. at 496). 
37. Id. at 536-37. The dissenters rejected the heavy reliance on Daily Mail, a case involving 
information disclosed as to an offender rather than a victim. They argued that the rule in Daily Mail 
"should not be so uncritically accepted as constitutional dogma." I d. at 545 (White, J., dissenting). 
38. Florida Star, 491 U.S. at 544; see infra text accompanying notes 45-47. 
39. Florida Star, 491 U.S. at 538. Justice Marshall went ou to remark that deference at that 
point should be given to the publishers: 
Once the government has placed such information in the public domain, "reliance must 
rest upon the judgment of those who decide what to publish or broadcast," and hopes for 
restitution must rest upon the willingness of the government to compensate victims for 
their loss of privacy, and to protect them from the other consequences of its mishandling of 
the information which these victims provided in confidence. 
ld. at 538-39 (quoting Cox Broadcasting, 420 U.S. at 496). 
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life was one that a reasonable person would find highly offensive."40 
Instead, because the trial judge adopted a per se theory of negligence, a 
defendant would be found liable even where the victim's identity had 
already been known, or where the victim had voluntarily called public 
attention to the crime.41 
The third reason offered was the Court's concern with the "facial 
underinclusiveness" of the statute because it only prohibited publication 
of the victim's identity in instruments of mass communication.42 
Because the statute did not deal with other situations that might have 
been at least as significant,43 the majority could not find that the statute 
was necessary to accomplish the stated purpose of the Florida 
legislature. 44 
Ultimately, therefore, the Court's holding became simply another in 
the line of cases beginning with Cox Broadcasting that upheld the pub-
lisher's right to disclose truthful information even in situations which are 
very difficult for the victims of crime. The difference here-and it is a 
significant difference-is that the Court for the first time appeared to rec-
ognize an important state interest in protecting the victims of sexual 
offenses against the disclosure of their names to the public.45 Justice 
Marshall's opinion articulated several purposes proffered by the state of 
Florida for adopting its rule against publication. This list included pro-
tecting the privacy of sexual offense victims, protecting the physical 
safety of such individuals, and encouraging future victims of crime to 
report offenses without fear of exposure.46 Justice Marshall recognized 
the importance of these interests. "At a time in which we are daily 
40. Id. at 539. 
41. Id. Justice White strongly disputed this conclusion by the Court, emphasizing that the 
jury here had specifically found that the publisher had acted with "reckless indifference towards the 
rights of others." Id. at 548 (White, J., dissenting). 
42. Justice Scalia, concurring, would have decided the case relying exclusively on the unwill-
ingness of the state to prohibit publication except by the media. He found that the state action here 
left "appreciable damage to that supposedly vital interest unprohibited." Florida Star, 491 U.S. at 
542 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
43. The statute obviously did not cover any "individual who maliciously spreads word of the 
identity of a rape victim." Florida Star, 491 U.S. at 540. 
44. Id. at 540-41. The dissenters again challenged this view, writing that the civil action here 
was not actually for a violation of the statute but was for the negligent publication of the victim's 
name and thus should be viewed as part of the "whole of Florida privacy tort law." They argued 
that because Florida recognized a tort of publication of private facts, individual defendants might 
well be covered by the tort law, even if not by the statute. Id. at 549-50 (White, J., dissenting). 
45. "The Court [in Cox Broadcasting] gave virtually no consideration to the privacy interests 
claimed by the family of the rape and murder victim .•.. " Marcus, The Media in the Courtroom: 
Attending. Reporting, Televising Criminal Cases, 57 IND. L.J. 235, 269 (1982). 
46. Florida Star, 491 U.S. at 537. 
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reminded of the tragic reality of rape, it is undeniable that these are 
highly significant interests, a fact underscored by the Florida Legisla-
ture's explicit attempt to protect these interests by enacting a criminal 
statute prohibiting much dissemination of victim identities. "47 
The dissenting opinion of Justice White48 stated the rationale even 
more poignantly: 
"Short of homicide, [rape] is the 'ultimate violation of self.'" For 
B.J.F., however, the violation she suffered at a rapist's knifepoint 
marked only the beginning of her ordeal. A week later, while her 
assailant was still at large, an account of this assault-identifying by 
name B.J.F. as the victim-was published by The Florida Star. As a 
result, B.J.F. received harassing phone calls, required mental health 
counseling, was forced to move from her home, and was even 
threatened with being raped again. 49 
Justice Marshall wrote that state activity in this area-presumably 
based upon properly and narrowly drafted statutes-might well survive 
constitutional scrutiny in order to protect these important interests: 
We accordingly do not rule out the possibility that, in a proper case, 
imposing civil sanctions for publication of the name of a rape victim 
might be so overwhelmingly necessary to advance these interests as to 
satisfy the Daily Mail standard. 50 
Our holding today is limited. We do not hold that truthful publi-
cation is automatically constitutionally protected, or that there is no 
zone of personal privacy within which the State may protect the indi-
vidual from intrusion by the press, or even that a State may never pun-
ish publication of the name of a victim of a sexual offense. We hold 
only that where a newspaper publishes truthful information which it 
has lawfully obtained, punishment may lawfully be imposed, if at all, 
only when narrowly tailored to a state interest of the highest order 
51 
47. Id. 
48. Joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice O'Connor. 
49. Florida Star, 491 U.S. at 542-43 (White, J., dissenting) (quoting Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 
584, 597 (1977)). 
SO. Florida Star, 491 U.S at 537. 
51. I d. at 541. Some have argued that there can be little doubt that the opinion in the Florida 
Star case will strongly encourage state legislatures to move in this area and to draft statutes along the 
lines suggested by the majority opinion. See, e.g., Sanford & Noble, For the Press, Privacy Ruling 
Not Good News, Nat'! L.J., Aug. 21, 1989, at S-7, col. 3: 
Like New York Times, Florida Star presented the Supreme Court with the rare oppor-
tunity to fashion a much needed national standard of liability in an area of the law pre-
sumptively governed by the First Amendment. Its decision not to do so serves as a clear 
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The Florida Star decision illustrates the Court's ongoing struggle to 
strike an appropriate balance between the media's freedom of the press 
and the rape victim's right of privacy. In our view, a legal and policy 
analysis establishes that the identity of a rape victim does fall within a 
zone of personal privacy that the state may and should protect from 
intrusion by the press. We further believe that a statute can be drafted 
that will provide such protection and will withstand constitutional 
scrutiny. 
IV. LIMITING DISCLOSURE OF RAPE VICTIMS' NAMES AS 
A MATTER OF PUBLIC POLICY 
No crime is ~nore horribly invasive or more brutally intimate than 
rape. Justice White described the crime as the "ultimate violation of 
self," short of homicide.52 Yet the effects of rape do not end with the 
crime itself. At the same time a victim is suffering from the severe emo-
tional and physical traumas brought on by the rape, she is also being 
scrutinized and judged by her community. There is no other crime in 
which the victim risks being blamed and in so insidious a way-she asked 
for it, she wanted it. 53 
This is the stigma society has placed on the rape victim and sadly it 
continues to be prevalent today. Robert M. Morgenthau, District Attor-
ney for the County of New York, writes: 
While our society has made progress in sympathizing with rape vic-
tims, it remains commonplace for the community to look with suspi-
cion and blame upon the rape victim, wondering why she didn't offer 
more resistance or why she was at a particular location at a particular 
time-as if she were somehow responsible for her own assault. 54 
signal that the court has neither the intention nor the desire to "nationalize" privacy law, 
i.e. preempt state laws with the complex protections it has provided in defamation Jaw. 
The decision is likely to usher in a new decade of invasion-of-privacy legislation and litiga-
tion at the state level. 
52. Florida Star, 491 U.S at 542 (White, J., dissenting) (citing Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 
597 (1977)). 
53. Overholser, American Shame: The Stigma of Rape, Des Moines Reg., July 11, 1989, at 6A. 
See sources cited supra note 2; see also Macrae & Shephard, Sex Differences in the Perception of Rape 
Victims, 4 J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 278 (1989) (describing how men's and women's percep-
tions of rape victims differ and are altered by variations in the characteristics of the victim); Study 
Finds People Believe Rape Victims Contribute to Assault Despite Assailant's Guilt, HIGHER Eouc. & 
NAT'L .AFF., July 4, 1988, at 5 [hereinafter Victims Contribute] (presenting the results of a study that 
show that victims of rape are perceived as blameworthy); Biele, Don't Pressure Victims in Disclosing 
Names, USA Today, Apr. 4, 1990, at SA, col. 5 ("Victims are still blamed for where they were, how 
they were dressed, who they were with, how they live."). 
54. Morganthau, Letter to the Editor, NEWSWEEK, May 7, 1990, at 13. For an illustration of 
Mr. Morgenthau's point, see Komheiser, Making Sport of Life's Rules, Wash. Post, May 25, 1990, at 
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Nancy F. Biele, executive director of the Sexual Violence Center, sup-
ports Mr. Morgenthau's opinion, writing, "Studies show that the charac-
teristics of the victim (not the offender) influence how the public reacts to 
a sexual-assault story."55 Depending on the victim's attributes-whom 
she was with, how she was dressed, how she lives-the victim may be 
seen as more responsible for her actions than the rapist is for his actions. 
Despite society's proclivity to judge victims of rape, some people 
argue that victims' names should be routinely disclosed and that such 
disclosures would remove the stigma attached to rape. 56 They assert that 
to remain silent only perpetuates the falsehood that a rape victim is an 
outcast and incapable of future normal relations. For a rape victim to 
keep quiet implies agreement with the notion that a woman's body 
belongs to one man and that she is "damaged goods" if another man 
touches her. To treat victims of rape differently from victims ofburglary 
or other crimes where the victim's name is routinely reported, they 
argue, insinuates that being raped is such a disgrace for a woman that her 
name must be concealed. Karen DeCrow, former president of the 
National Organization for Women, emphasizes these points by proclaim-
ing, "Now is the time for us to understand that keeping the hunted under 
wraps merely establishes her as an outcast and implies that her chances 
for normal social relations are doomed forevermore. Pull off the veil of 
shame. Print the name. "57 
We strongly disagree with the view that keeping rape victims' identi-
ties private contributes to the stigma of rape. We also believe that those 
who seek routine disciosure of victims' names are not adequately consid-
ering the harm such an action would bring to the victim. For example, 
in the same column where DeCrow demands that the media "stop treat-
ing victims as pariahs" and print their names, she also says, "While [the 
D1, col. I, which discusses the community's reaction to the alleged rape of a 17 year-old girl by four 
Washington Capitals hockey players. Kornheiser wrote: 
The men and women I've talked to ... are appalled by the general description of what took 
place, but many are also skeptical of the girl's motives. 'What was she doing there to begin 
with?' is the comment I most frequently hear. Even in this age of enlightenment they seem 
more receptive to the notion of condemning a 'bad girl' than a 'bad boy.' 
Id. at D-8, col. 6 (emphasis added). 
55. Biele, supra note 53. 
56. See, e.g., Kaplan & Leonard, Should We Reveal Her Name?, NEWSWEEK, Apr. 2, 1990, at 
48 (''The paradox ... is that 'by not printing her name, you're just perpetuating the myth that rape is 
the worst possible thing that can happen to a woman.' "(quoting author Susan Brownmiller)); 
DeCrow, Stop Treating Victims as Pariahs; Print Names, USA Today, Apr. 4, 1990, at SA, col. 5; 
Overholser, supra note 53. 
57. DeCrow, supra note 56. 
1032 SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 64:1019 
woman who was raped while jogging in Central Park in 1989] was hospi-
talized, and in recovery, it seemed insensitive and inappropriate to com-
ment. But, ... [now that she] has returned to her job ... [i]t is fitting to 
ask why she was never identified."58 To us, it is more fitting to ask why 
DeCrow, society, or the media should determine for the victim when 
publicizing her name will no longer be insensitive, will no longer cause 
her emotional harm, or will no longer create further physical danger. 
Every individual's recovery process is unique. Research shows that for 
most victims the trauma caused by rape lasts a minimum of three years 
and, depending on the circumstances, can be permanent. 59 For a third 
party arbitrarily to pick a point in time-such as when the victim is 
released from the hospital, when she returns to her job, when she 
resumes social activities, or when her assailant is in jail-as the appropri-
ate end to a healing period is to sacrifice unilaterally the victim's well-
being for no tangible benefit. Furthermore, asserting that a victim is 
helping to perpetuate the stigma of rape by keeping her identity private 
while she is going through this healing process is a calloused response to 
the problem. 
Geneva Overholser, the editor of the Des Moines Register, suggests 
that by not printing the victim's name the media is subscribing to the 
idea that rape is not a crime of brutal violence, and she believes that this 
"sour blight of prejudice is best subjected to strong sunlight."60 But we 
must ask ourselves, who and what would be exposed under this strong 
sunlight? Revealing the identity of the victim against her wishes focuses 
the attention on the victim, not on those who foster prejudicial views. 
The goal sought by those who advocate routine disclosure of rape vic-
tims' names-erasing the stigma inflicted on victims of rape-would not 
be realized by publicizing their names. 61 In fact, such an action would 
likely strengthen the stigma and have other damaging repercussions as 
well. According to the Sexual Violence Center in Minneapolis, most 
58. Jd. 
59. National Center for the Prevention & Control of Rape, The Sexual Assault Research Pro· 
ject: Assessing the Aftermath of Rape, RESPONSE, Fall 1985, at 20-24 [hereinafter Sexual Assault 
Research Project]; See sources cited supra note 2. 
60. Overholser, supra note 53. 
61. Nancy Ziegenmeyer, a rape victim who voluntarily went public with her identity and the 
details of her rape in response to the Des Moines Register editorial, agrees with our view, stating, 
"We're not going to lessen the stigma by just publishing victims' names. We need to educate society 
to what rape is." Feedback: Other Views on the Crime of Rape, USA Today, July 20, 1990, at 13A, 
col. I. Indeed, she recently noted that if she had known at the time of the crime that her identity 
would be disclosed, "I would not have reported the crime." Worthington, supra note 3. 
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public disclosures tend to reinforce rather than dispel sexual assault ste-
reotypes. 62 One explanation for this result is that sixty to eighty percent 
of rapes are committed by an acquaintance, a date, or a husband, 63 and 
frequently the community does not react with support in those situa-
tions. 64 Family and friends may reject the victim, employers may ques-
tion her veracity, and others may attempt to distance themselves from 
the crime and its victim. For these reasons, most women who do go 
public with their stories are white, middle class women in stable relation-
ships who are raped by strangers. 65 Revealing a victim's name without 
her permission would not change this pattern as the proponents claim. 
In addition, why must the victim, who has already suffered from the 
ordeal of rape, be forced to bear the responsibility of educating society 
and changing its prejudicial view toward rape and its victims? These 
negative views have been developed and reinforced by many segments of 
our society-parents, teachers, newspaper and television reporters, film-
makers, politicians, sports heroes, and other role models. 66 The seeds of 
62. Biele, supra note 53; telephone interview with Nancy Fride Biele, executive director of the 
Sexual Violence Center in Minneapolis (July 12, 1990). 
63. Women Facing Increased Violence, USA Today, July 18, 1990, at 2A, col. 2 (citing the U.S. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSfiCE, 1988 FBI UNIFORM CRIME REPORT, NATIONAL CRIME SURVEY); see 
also Women and Violence: Hearing on Legislation to Reduce the Growing Problem of Violent Crime 
Against Women Before the Senate Comm on the Judicary, Part 2, tolst Cong., 2d Sess. (1990) 
[hereinafter Hearings on Women and Violence]. More than half college rape victums are attacked by 
dates. More than four out of five victims know their attackers. Id. at 77. A woman has a one in six 
chance of being raped by an acquaintance in her lifetime Id. at 74. A national study of rape victims 
found only 11% of the rapes and attempted rapes were perpetrated by strangers, whereas 62% were 
perpetrated by male relatives, current or former husbands, boyfriends, and lovers. The remainder 
were perpetrated by acquaintances with whom the repondent was not romantically involved. Id. at 
36. 
64. "We are finding that any degree of prior acquaintance, no matter how superficial, dramati-
cally affects the way that the victim is viewed," says Eugenia Gerdes, associate professor of psychol-
ogy, who conducted a Bucknell University study on the subject. Victims Contribute, supra note 53. 
65. Telephone interview with Nancy Fride Biele, supra note 62. 
66. See, e.g., Overheard, NEWSWEEK, July 16, 1990, at 15 (quoting Bill Carpenter, mayor of 
Independence, Missouri: "I say this a lot, and I probably shouldn't: the difference between rape and 
seduction is salesmanship."); Saholz, Clift, Springen & Johnson, Women Under Assault, NEWS-
WEEK, July 16, 1990, at 24, ("Sexual assaults are a staple of TV and movies; according to the 
National Coalition on Television Violence in Champaign, Ill., one out of eight Hollywood films 
depicts rape."); Callahan, Sex, Lies and Sporting Heroes, Wash. Post, May 27, 1990, at C3, col. 2 
("[O]n national television, Indiana [University] basketball coach Bobby Knight reconfirms the gen-
eral atmosphere and attitude with his cheerful advice to Connie Chung: 'If rape is inevitable, relax 
and enjoy it.'"); Komheiser, supra note 54, at D8, col. 6 (''The Washington Capitals report not a 
single ticket cancellation in protest, not a single angry letter demanding that these players be pun-
ished, or traded, or asking who is responsible for bringing them to this team.''); Mann, Running for 
Governor with '60s Attitudes, Wash. Post, Apr. 25, 1990, at D3, col. 5 (Mann wrote that Clayton 
Wheat Williams Jr., Republican candidate for governor in Texas, compared the drizzle that was 
dampening his plans for a cattle roundup to a rape, stating: "If it's inevitable, just relax and enjoy 
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change must come from these same individuals if society is to make any 
meaningful progress in changing its attitude about rape victims. 67 
The media is tremendously influential in our society in forming pub-
lic opinion on many issues. Consequently, it plays an important part in 
the process of educating citizens about rape. Routinely publicizing vic-
tims' names would not be a responsible step toward furthering this 
effort, 68 and the arguments put forth to support a policy of publicizing 
victims' names are unconvincing. For example, the media has argued 
that the victim's name is necessary to add credibility to a story. NBC 
News president Michael Gartner states, "As wounding as revealing her 
name may be, it's news. Specifics add credibility to the story."69 This 
claim lacks merit. The media has access to police reports, court files, and 
judicial proceedings, which provide specific details of an alleged rape. 
The press also may be able to obtain many personal facts about the vic-
tim through interviews and other investigative measures that can add 
credibility to a story.70 With this comprehensive information available, 
it." He later said the comment was "only a joke."); Hearings on Women and Violence, supra note 
63, Part 2 at 66 (statement of Helen R. Neuborne, Executive Director, and Sally Goldfarb, Staff 
Attorney of NOW Legal Defense Fund on Violence Against Women). The statement discussed 
judicial insensitivity to rape in a case where a man wearing a mask broke into a woman's apartment 
and raped her. The judge stated: 
As I recall [the defendant] did go into [the victim's] apartment without permission .. , He 
was drunk, jumped into the saek with her, had sex and went to sleep. I think it started 
without consent, but maybe they ended up enjoying themselves . . . It was not like a rape 
on the street . . . People hear rape and they think of the poor girl in the park dragged into 
the bushes. But it wasn't like that. 
/d. (quoting In re Fromer, Determination of the New York State Comm'n on Judicial Conduct 2 
(Oct. 25, 1984)). 
67. For a positive example of what needs to be done, see Hearings on Women and Violence, 
supra note 63, Part 1 at 3 (statement of Chairman Joseph R. Biden, sponsor of S. 2754): 
So part of what I have in mind here is to heighten public awareness and change as a 
priority in America. . . . One of the things we have to change is the attitude about rape. I 
don't know how to do it, unless we begin to discuss it. Do you know how many times I 
read statistics and studies and juror after juror says 'well maybe the woman invited it.' 
68. An April 4, 1990 poll taken by Gannett News Service/USA Today found that an over-
whelming majority of the public also believes that the names of rape victims should be kept out of 
news stories unless the victim agrees: 84% say rape victims should decide whether their names 
become public, while only 5% think the media should decide whether to print or broadcast names. 
Lundstrom, Poll: Don't Name Rape Victims, USA Today, Apr. 9, 1990, at 3A, col. 6. In a poll 
conducted by USA Today on April 17, 1991, the percentage of those polled who s!lid that rape 
victims should decide for themselves whether their names become public rose to 91%. Sanchez, 
Rape Poll: No Names say 91%, USA Today, April18, 1991, at 1, col. 2. 
69. Kaplan & Leonard, supra note 56, at 48. 
70. For example, in the case of a woman gang-raped in Manhattan on Apri119, 1989, the press 
was able to learn and report to the public, among other details, the victim's age (29 years old), her 
education (Phi Beta Kappa from Wellesley; master's degree from Yale), her job (investment banker 
at Salomon Brothers), her family (devout Catholic in Upper St. Clair, Pennsylvania), and her hobby 
(jogging in Central Park) (She is now referred to as the "Central Park jogger."), See id.; Kurtz, 
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whether the victim was named Jane Doe or Sue Smith is not a necessary · 
element to make a story believable. 
Overholser, in contrast takes a different approach in her argument 
by attempting to analogize the desired results of publicizing a rape vic-
tim's name with the apparent actual results of newspaper coverage of gay 
issues. She writes, "Take homosexuality: Until recently very few gay 
men or lesbians sought public identification. Now many identify them-
selves assertively and proudly. Newspaper treatment of gay issues has 
evolved apace. And society's understanding of homosexuality has grown 
and matured."71 This argument is weak for at least two reasons. First, 
the editor refers to newspaper treatment of gay "issues." Without a 
doubt we believe the "issues" of rape-the frequency of its occurrence, 
its long term impact on the victim, and the brutal violence associated 
with it-need better coverage by the media if society's understanding of 
the crime is to grow and mature. It does not follow, however, that effec-
tive coverage of rape issues must include the victim's name. Second, the 
editor states that many homosexuals now "identify themselves" asser-
tively and proudly. In other words, they go public voluntarily. The rape 
victim should at minimum be given this same prerogative. 
In response to the Des Moines Register's plea for rape victims to 
speak out, one victim, Nancy Ziegenmeyer, did come forward to publicly 
reveal her identity and the terrifying, explicit details of her rape. 72 She 
has been called courageous for her action and indeed she is courageous. 
Yet, the decision to go public was Ziegenmeyer's, not the media's. And 
despite the accolades she has received, she remains firm in her belief that 
a rape victim's name should not be made public by the press without the 
victim's permission. She states, ''That is a decision that should be made 
by the victim when they're healed enough. Speaking out publicly is not 
for all victims."73 Rape is a unique crime in our society because of the 
stigma attached to it and the extreme psychological and physical harm 
Brutalized N.Y. Jogger Testifies; Women Describes Permanent Effects of Attack She Can't Remem-
ber, Wash. Post, July 17, 1990, at A3, col. 1. 
71. Overholser, supra note 53. 
72. See Scharer, It Couldn't Happen to Me: One Woman's Story, Des Moines Reg., Feb. 25-
Mar. 1, 1990, at 1A (series of five articles). Nancy Ziegenrneyer also appeared on numerous local 
and national television programs such as Good Morning America on March 28, 1990, and testified 
before the Senate Judiciary Committee on June 20, 1990. Hearings on Women and Violence, supra 
note 63, Part 1 at 22-26. 
73. Scharer, Rape Story: A Flood of Positive Reaction, Des Moines Reg., Mar. 3, 1990, at 2A. 
Nancy Ziegenmeyer further stated: "I would encourage any rape victim to come forward who has 
gone through enough counseling and has a support system and she thinks it is right for her. No one 
should dictate to rape victims that they should speak out. It must be their choice." Feedback: Other 
Views on the Crime of Rape, supra note 61. 
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caused by it. Good public policy recognizes this and gives the victim, not 
the media, the choice of revealing her identity. To establish such a public 
policy and ensure that it will withstand a constitutional challenge, one 
must also review the legal issues involved and determine the proper bal-
ance a policy must maintain to protect the victim's right of privacy with-
out unduly interfering with the media's first amendment rights. 
V. PRIVACY AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 
The creation of a right to privacy began in 1890 when Samuel D. 
Warren and Louis D. Brandeis wrote what has been referred to as the 
"most influential law review article of all."74 The now famous and often 
cited article grew out of Warren and Brandeis's belief that individuals 
needed to be protected from the increasing excesses of the press. They 
wrote: 
Recent inventions and business methods call attention to the next step 
which must be taken for the protection of the person, and for securing 
to the individual what Judge Cooley calls the right 'to be let alone.' 
Instantaneous photographs and newspaper enterprise have invaded the 
sacred precincts of private and domestic life; and numerous mechani-
cal devices threaten to make good the prediction that 'what is whis-
pered in the closet shall be proclaimed from the house-tops.' . . . The 
press is overstepping in every direction the obvious bounds of propriety 
and of decency. . . . [M]odem enterprise and invention have, through 
invasions upon [an individual's] privacy, subjected him to mental pain 
and distress, far greater than could be inflicted by mere bodily injury.75 
The propositions put forth by Warren and Brandeis generated extensive 
legal debate over whether existing law afforded the principle that each 
person had a cognizable legal interest in private life, both physical and 
emotional. 76 Although the appellate court in the first state to confront 
the issue did not accept the Warren and Brandeis principle,77 a subse-
quent state court did recognize the existence of a distinct right to privacy 
in Pasvesich v. New England Life Insurance Co.,18 which became the 
74. Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890). The article is so 
described in Kalven, Privacy in Tort Law-Were Warren and Brandeis Wrong?, 31 LAW & CON· 
TEMP. PROBS. 326, 327 (1966). 
75. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 74, at 195-96 (citing T. COOLEY, COOLEY ON TORTS 29 (2d 
ed. 1888)). 
76. W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, PROSSER & KEETON ON TORTS 850 (W. Keeton 5th cd. 
1984); Kalven, supra note 74, at 326. 
77. Kalven, supra note 74, at 327 (citing Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co., 171 N.Y. 
538, 64 N.E. 442 (1902)). 
78. 122 Ga. 190, 50 S.E. 68 (1905). See W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 76, at 851 
(citing Pasvesich, 122 Ga. 190, 50 S.E. 68); see also Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 
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leading case in this area. Several years after the Pasvesich decision, an 
action for privacy was included in the Restatement of Torts 79 and today 
virtually all jurisdictions accept the right of privacy in one form or 
another.80 
The product of this evolution is a body of privacy law which, as 
defined by Prosser, comprises the invasion of four different interests of 
the plaintiff. 8 I Disclosure of a sexual assault victim's identity falls under 
the category called "public disclosure of private facts." Scholars have 
not unanimously determined all the private facts about an individual that 
are protected under this category, but they have agreed that the law is 
intended to reflect the need of individuals to keep some core of their 
personality to themselves, outside the notice of society. 82 The ultimate 
value at stake has been described as human dignity, individuality, and 
autonomy, but the primary point is that control of personal information 
about oneself is the essence of privacy. 83 The interest a wholly private 
individual has in keeping her name out of the public limelight while she 
recovers from the personal tragedy of rape lies at the heart of this right. 
The constitutional right competing with the interests of the rape vic-
tim who seeks to keep her identity private is the first amendment freedom 
of the press to report on matters of legitimate public concern. Both the 
freedom of the press and the right of privacy protect interests which the 
489 (1975) (noting that the Georgia Supreme Court first recognized the right to privacy in 
Pasevich.); Kalven, supra note 74, at 327 (noting that Pasevich was the first case in the country to 
recognize explicity the right of privacy). 
79. W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 76, at 851 (citing REsTATEMENT (FIRST) OF 
TORTS § 867 (1934-39)) (approving a cause of action for "unreasonable and serious" interference 
with privacy). 
80. Id. 
81. The four categories are as follows: 1) unreasonable intrusion upon the seclusion of 
another; 2) appropriation of another's name or likeness; 3) public disclosure of private facts about 
another; and 4) publicity which unreasonably places another in a false light before the public. Pros-
ser was of the opinion that to find liability in a suit based on public disclosure of private facts, the 
plaintiff must show that the disclosure of the private facts is a public disclosure and is not privileged, 
that the facts disclosed to the public are private, and that the disclosure is highly offensive and would 
be objectionable to a reasonable person of ordinary sensibilities. The Restatement of Torts adds that 
the public must not have a legitimate interest in having the information readily available. W. PROS-
SER & W. KEETON, supra note 76, at 851-63. 
82. Note, Privacy and the First Amendment, 82 YALE L.J. 1462, 1474 (1973) (citing H. 
ARENDT, THE HUMAN CoNDmON 22-78 (1958); E. GOFFMAN, THE PRESENTATION OF SELF IN 
EVERDAY LIFE (1959); A. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 8-63 (1967); Blaustein, Privacy as an 
Aspect of Human Dignity: An Answer to Dean Prosser, 39 N.Y.U. L. REv. 962, 1002-03 (1964); 
Simmel, Privacy is Not an Isolated Freedom, 13 NoMOS 71, 72-74 (1971), Warren & Brandeis, The 
Right to Pril'acy, 4 HARV. L. REv. 193, 205 (1890); Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 92 (1966) 
(Stewart, J., concurring)). 
83. Note, supra note 82, at 1474. 
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Supreme Court views as "plainly rooted in the traditions and significant 
concerns of our society."84 The Court notes that "[t]he tension between 
the right which the First Amendment accords to a free press, on the one 
hand, and the protections which various statutes and common-law doc-
trines accord to personal privacy against the publication of truthful infor-
mation, on the other," is an issue courts have frequently addressed. 85 
The mechanism the Court has developed for resolving these competing 
interests is a balancing test. Rather than apply a strict rule, the Court 
attempts to determine which party's interest is more compelling or what 
weights to give the competing values. The Supreme Court's use of a bal-
ancing test to resolve conflicting press and privacy interests was restated 
by Justice Relmquist in the Daily Mail case: 
Historically, we have viewed freedom of speech and of the press as 
indispensable to a free society and its government. But recognition of 
this proposition has not meant that the public interest in free speech 
and press always has prevailed over competing interests of the pub-
He .... '[t]he press is not free to publish with impunity everything and 
anything it desires to publish.' . . . [W]e have eschewed absolutes in 
favor of a more delicate calculus that carefully weighs the conflicting 
interests to determine which demands the greater protection under the 
particular circumstances presented. 86 
AP. a result of this balancing process by the courts, for most of the twenti-
eth century our courts experienced a strong tide running in favor of the 
individual's right of privacy over the press's reporting interest. 87 One of 
the most famous cases is Melvin v. Reid, 88 where the plaintiff was a for-
mer prostitute who was tried for murder and acquitted, then later mar-
ried and became "entirely rehabilitated." She sued the defendant for 
making a movie seven years after the trial which depicted her former life 
and used her actual name. 89 The court held that absent the use of the 
plaintiff's name, the movie would have been protected because the public 
had a right to know the details of the plaintiff's trial that were part of a 
public record.90 However, the public's interest did not include the need 
84. Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 491 (1975). 
85. Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 530 (1989). 
86. Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co., 443 U.S. 97, 106 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., concurring) 
(emphasis added) (citing Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 683 (1972)); Near v. Minnesota ex rei. 
Olson, 283 U.S. 697, 708, 716 (1931). 
87. Cox Broadcasting, 420 U.S. at 488. 
88. 112 Cal. App. 285, 297 P. 91 (1931) (superseded by statute as stated in Roberts v. Gulf Oil 
Corp., 147 Cal. App. 3d 770, 195 Cal. Rptr. 393 (1983)). 
89. Id. at 286, 297 P. at 91. 
90. Id. at 290-91, 297 P. at 93. 
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to know the plaintiff's name because it was not newsworthy and there-
fore the use of the plaintifrs name "was not justified."91 
In State v. Evjue,92 where the defendant published a rape victim's 
name in violation of a state criminal statute,93 the court held that the 
statute did not violate the constitutional freedom of the press. The court 
reasoned: 
[The statute] was no doubt intended to save from embarrassment and 
offensive publicity women who have been the subject of the kind of 
assault delineated in the statute, and to aid law enforcement officers to 
more readily obtain evidence for the prosecution of such criminal 
offenses. It is considered that it is a matter of common knowledge that 
such victims suffer far beyond anything suffered by men or women in 
connection with other classes of crimes. It was to prevent this and aid 
prosecuting offers that the legislature of this and 19 other states have 
enacted laws of this general character.94 
The court found that the publication of the identity of the female minis-
tered to a morbid desire to cotmect the details of one of the most detesta-
ble crimes known to the law with the identity of the victim. 
Demonstrating its balancing approach, the court wrote: 
When the situation of the victhn of the assault and the handicap prose-
cuting officers labor under in such cases is weighed against the benefit 
of publishing the identity of the victhn in connection with the details of 
the crime, there can be no doubt that the slight restriction of the free-
dom of the press prescribed by [the statute] is fully justified.95 
Although the court in Sidis v. F-R Publishing Corp. 96 did not rule in 
favor of the plaintiff because it determined the plaintiff was already a 
public figure, language from that case has been relied upon in subsequent 
cases upholding the plaintiff's right to privacy over the freedom of the 
press: "Revelations may be so intimate and so unwarranted in view of 
the victim's position as to outrage the community's notions of 
91. /d. at 292, 297 P. at 93. 
92. 253 Wis. 146, 33 N.W.2d 305 (1948). 
93. The statute in question, Sec. 348.412, Stats. 1945, provided as follows: 
Any person who shall publish or cause to be published in any newspaper, magazine, 
periodical or circular, except as the same may be necessary in the institution or prosecution 
of any civil or criminal court proceeding, or in the compilation of the records pertaining 
thereto, the identity of a female who may have been raped or subjected to any similar 
criminal assault, shall be punished by imprisonment in the county jail for not more than 
one year or by fine not exceeding five hundred dollars, or by both such fine and 
imprisonment. 
/d. at 153, 33 N.W.2d at 308. 
94. /d. at 155, 33 N.W.2d at 309. 
95. /d. at 161-62, 33 N.W.2d at 312. 
96. 113 F.2d 806 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 711 (1940). 
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decency."97 For example, in Garner v. Triangle Publications Inc. 98 the 
media defendant published magazine articles containing photographs 
and stories portraying the plaintiff as a principal participant in the mur-
der of the plaintiff's husband. Quoting from Sidis, the court held that 
the defendant went beyond the limits of decency. It reasoned that if indi-
viduals "go beyond the bounds of propriety and decency, they should not 
be cloaked with and shielded by the public interest in dissemination of 
'information'."99 Similarly, in Nappier v. Jefferson Standard Life Insur-
ance Co. 100 the court ruled against the media defendant when the defend-
ant violated a state statute making it a misdemeanor to publish a rape 
victim's name. The defendant's television broadcast identified two rape 
victims through photos of their vehicle, which prominently displayed the 
name of their puppet show, "Little Jack." In holding for the plaintiff, 
the court reasoned: 
Aside from the personal protection of the woman involved, the object 
of the law, concededly is to encourage a free report of the crime by the 
victim. Fear of publicity might deter her from notifying police. Thus 
the public interest is advanced by the statute: the crime is investigated 
promptly and the injured person is shielded. 101 
The above cases illustrate the significance the courts place on both 
the individual's interest in maintaining as private certain truthful infor-
mation and the state's interests in enforcing the statutes protecting such 
privacy. In recent years, however, the courts have shifted away from this 
value assessment and their decisions have without exception sided with 
the press's right to publish. 102 As Justice White notes in Florida Star, 
"[T]he trend in 'modern' jurisprndence has been to eclipse an individ-
ual's right to maintain private any truthful information that the press 
wished to publish."103 With its decision in Cox Broadcasting, the 
Supreme Court appears to have charted a course which it continues to 
follow. For example, two years after Cox Broadcasting, the Court in 
Oklahoma Publishing Co. v. District Court 104 extended first amendment 
protection to publication of a juvenile's name obtained during what by 
statute should have been a closed juvenile proceeding. The Court rea-
soned that even though the juvenile court judge violated the statute by 
97. Id. at 809. 
98. 97 F. Supp. 546 (S.D.N.Y. 1951). 
99. Id. at 550. 
100. 322 F.2d 502 (4th Cir. 1963). 
101. /d. at 504. 
102. Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 530 (1989). 
103. Id. at 553 (White, J., dissenting). 
104. 430 u.s. 308 (1977). 
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permitting reporters to attend the hearing, once the truthful information 
was "publicly revealed" or "in the public domain," the Court could not 
constitutionally restrain its subsequent dissemination. In Landmark 
Communications v. Virginia, 105 the Court held that under the first 
amendment, Virginia could not criminally punish a newspaper for 
divulging the confidential identity of a state judge whose conduct was 
being investigated. The Court felt that the state's interest in maintaining 
the confidentiality of the judicial review commission proceedings was 
insufficient to justify encroachments on the freedom of the press. Simi-
larly, in the important case of Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co. 106 the 
Court found that the state's interest in protecting the anonymity of a 
juvenile offender was not significant enough to warrant criminal punish-
ment for the disclosure of such information. There, the press was given 
constitutional protection when it identified the juvenile after learning his 
name by monitoring routine police radio frequencies and by interviewing 
witnesses at the scene of a crime. 
State and lower federal courts have followed the Supreme Court's 
current lead and consistently upheld the press's right to publish over an 
individual's right to privacy. In Ayers v. Lee Enterprises 107 the court, 
citing Cox Broadcasting, ruled in favor of a newspaper which published a 
rape victim's name and address obtained from a police report. The court 
reached this result despite the fact that when the victim reported the 
crime to the police she specifically requested that her privacy be pre-
served and her name and address not be made public. Although the 
Court stated "they were understanding of [the] problems and of the rea-
sons why the victim of a rape who reports that crime to the police with 
the request that her name not be made public would feel justifiably 
aggrieved at the release and publication of her name and address," 108 the 
Court went on to hold for the newspaper because it reasoned that any 
information obtained from a police report is a matter of public record 
and thus no liability could lie for its publication. 
The court in Poteet v. Rosewell Daily Record, Inc. 109 dismissed an 
invasion of privacy claim for the truthful publication of a fourteen-year-
old rape victim's name learned from a criminal complaint and published 
after a preliminary hearing. Again citing Cox Broadcasting, the court 
105. 435 u.s. 829 (1978). 
106. 443 U.S. 97 (1979). See supra text accompanying note 13. 
107. 277 Or. 527, 561 P.2d 998 (1977). 
108. /d. at 535, 561 P.2d at 1002-03. 
109. 92 N.M. 170, 584 P.2d 1310 (Ct. App. 1978). 
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said the incident was a matter of public record and therefore news-
worthy. The court dismissed the argument that the reporter had prom-
ised the district attorney the child's name would not·be published and 
that the newspaper had a policy of not using minors' names in reports of 
sexual assault incidents. Another key example of the current trend is 
Howard v. Des Moines Register, 110 where the court ruled that the press 
did not invade an institutionalized eighteen-year-old girl's privacy when 
it published the contents of her medical records indicating she had been 
sterilized. Even though her records were confidential pursuant to state 
statute; the court stated that the records lost their confidentiality when 
they were forwarded from the custodi~ to the governor's office and 
made part of a nonconfidential file of complaints against the agency 
authorizing the sterilization. 
These cases, along with the most recent Florida Star decision, repre-
sent the radical movement of the CQurts toward ruling in favor of the 
media over individuals seeking to keep very personal aspects of their lives 
out of society's view. While the Supreme Court stated in Florida Star 
that it has not exhaustively considered the first amendment and privacy 
conflicts in cases involving government attempts to sanction the dissemi-
nation of truthful information, 111 we believe the Court's efforts to strike 
an appropriate balance between the rape victim's right to privacy and the 
public's right to know have accorded far too little weight to the victim's 
side of the equation. This imbalance is giving the press the freedom to 
dwelve into matters that society has always considered to constitute an 
impenetrable sphere of privacy. If one combines this expanded freedom 
with today's advanced technology and methods for obtaining and com-
municating information, the potential results are astounding. 
In the late 1800's Warren and Brandeis feared the impact of inven-
tions such as instantaneous photographs and newspapers on an individ-
ual's private life. They were concerned about private information being 
proclaimed from house-tops and the impact of the rise of "yellow" jour-
nalism. Could they have even imagined the media would be capable of 
broadcasting a victim's name on radio waves coast-to-coast or around the 
world in a matter of minutes; or that the private details of a person's life 
could be discussed at the family breakfast table while they were being 
portrayed on a morning television show; or that a telephone could be 
110. 283 N.W.2d 289 (Iowa 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 904 (1980). 
111. Florida Star v. B.J.F., 109 S. Ct. 2603, 2607 (1989). 
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"tapped" and the contents of a private conversation published?112 The 
media's ability to penetrate and expose our private daily lives has far 
surpassed that which Warren and Brandeis sought to protect against. 
We believe the states must take action to curb effectively this invasion of 
individual privacy. We are optimistic that the final outcome of the pres-
ent trend of the courts is yet to be determined. Even though the Court in 
Florida Star ruled in favor of the media, it provided a window of oppor-
tunity for correcting this current imbalance when it declined to establish 
a broad rule constitutionally protecting any truthful informatioJI the 
media wished to publish, and at the same time specifically acknowledged 
the possible need for sanctions for publishing a rape victim's name. 113 
We believe such sanctions are necessary and that they would not prohibit 
the media from sufficiently fulfilling its role of reporting to the public 
matters of legitimate public concern. Moreover, as we explore that issue 
more fully, it becomes apparent that the Court and the media have 
demonstrated their belief in that premise as well. 
The Supreme Court has traditionally stressed the integral role of 
free speech in a democratic political system. 114 "The Court's theory rests 
on the premise that free speech provides citizens with that 'access to 
social, political, esthetic, moral and other ideas and experiences' which 
citizens require in order to perform 'self-governance'."115 
112. Justice White's dissent in Florida Star discusses his concern that under the Court's ruling, 
there will be no private facts that a person can be assured will not be published in newspapers or 
broadcast on television. I d. at 2618 n.4 (White, J., dissenting). He illustrates his point using Boett-
ger v. Loverro, 521 Pa. 366, 555 A.2d 1234 (1989). In Boettger, police officers had lawfully "tapped" 
the telephone of a man suspected of bookmaking. In a preliminary court hearing, a prosecutor 
inadvertently attached a transcript of the phone conversation to a document filed with the court. A 
reporter obtained a copy of the transcript due to this error, and his newspaper published a version of 
the remarks disclosed by the telephone tap. The trial court ruled that a newspaper could not be 
punished by civil damages for disclosures resulting from the negligence of custodians of confidential 
records. The Superior Court reversed. Although the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania upheld the 
civil liability award against the newspaper, concluding that individuals' rights to privacy outweighed 
the interest in public disclosure of such private telephone commuuications, Justice White writes that 
the Florida Star decision suggests that the Pennsylvania Court's ruling was erroneous. 
113. Florida Star, 491 U.S. at 541. 
114. Note, supra note 82, at 1463·64 (citing New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) as 
the leading case for the Court's articulation of this primary purpose of the first amendment); see also 
Landmark Communications v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 839 (1978) (citing New York Times v. Sulli-
van, 376 U.S. at 269-70; Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966) ("Whatever differences may 
exist about interpretations of the First Amendment, there is practically universal agreement that a 
major purpose of that Amendment was to protect the free discussion of governmental affairs.")). See 
generally Nimmer, The Right to Speak from Times to Time: First Amendment Theory Applied to 
Libel and Misapplied to Privacy, 56 CALlF. L. REv. 935 (1968) (defending the Supreme Court's ad 
hoc balancing of privacy and free speech rights). 
115. Note, supra note 82 at 1463 (quoting Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, 403 U.S. 29, 41 (1971)). 
1044 SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 64:1019 
In other words, "the First Amendment does not protect a freedom 
to speak. It protects the freedom of those activities of thought and com-
munication by which we govern."116 The Court reaffirmed this self-gov-
ernance rationale in Cox Broadcasting when it stated that the freedom of 
the press to publish information obtained from public judicial records is 
of "critical importance to [a democratic] government in which the citi-
zenry is the final judge of the proper conduct of public business."117 
In Cox Broadcasting a television reporter covering a murder and 
rape trial broadcasted information he obtained from official court records 
which were maintained in connection with the public prosecution and 
which were open to public inspection. Included in the court records and 
the reporter's news broadcast was the victhn's name, the disclosure of 
which was the issue in this lawsuit. In ruling for the television station, 
the Court explained that the judicial records from which the victim's 
name was obtained were an example of the very type of documents which 
contain basic data of government operations that the public must have 
access to in order to evaluate the effectiveness of the institutions which 
govern them. The Court added that because most individual citizens in 
our society have limited time and resources of their own to observe the 
operations of their governmental institutions firsthand, the press provides 
that function for them. In this respect, the press serves as a necessary 
link in the flow of vital information about government proceedings to the 
electorate, dispensing the information in a thnely and convenient format. 
Although the Court avoided identifying other types of official records 
which contain information that should be made available to the press for 
publication, it did decide that the media should be able to publish infor-
mation released to the public in official court records. The Court stated, 
"Without [such] information ... , most of us and many of our represent-
atives would be unable to vote intelligently or to register opinions on the 
administration of governm'ent generally."118 The key element, then, in 
both the Cox Broadcasting decision and the Court's traditional reasoning 
/d. 
116. Meiklejohn, The First Amendment is an Absolute, 1961 SUP. Cr. REv. 245, 255. 
We, the people who govern, must try to understand the issues which, incident by 
incident, face the nation. We must pass judgment upon the decisions which our agents 
make upon those issues. And, further, we must share in devising methods by which those 
decisions can be made wise and effective or, if need be, supplanted by others which promise 
greater wisdom and effectiveness. Now it is these activities, in all their diversity, whose 
freedom fills up 'the scope of the First Amendment.' These are the activities to whose 
freedom it gives its unqualified protection. And it must be recognized that the literal text 
of the Amendment falls far short of expressing the intent and the scope of that protection. 
117. Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 495 (1975). 
118. /d. at 492. 
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in this area is the relation of the published information to the public's 
self-governing process. This element is the critical factor in determining 
whether information is a legitimate matter of public concern. 
Acknowledging this axiom, the appellant in Florida Star argued that 
when the newspaper ran a story about the rape, it had printed a legiti-
mate matter of public concern. The appellant asserted that the matter 
involved the actions of government, was of concern to a self-governing 
people, and was within the responsibility of the press to report. 119 It 
quoted from Cox Broadcasting: ''The commission of crime, prosecutions 
resulting from it, and judicial proceedings arising from the prosecutions, 
however, are without question events of legitimate concern to the public 
and consequently fall within the responsibility of the press to report the 
operation of government."120 In actuality, however, when the newspaper 
included the rape victim's name in its story about the rape, it went 
beyond reporting information concerning the commission of a crime to 
reporting an intimate detail. The Court explicitly recognized this fact, as 
well as the unimportance of the victim's name to the public, when it 
stated, "[T]he article generally, as opposed to the specific identity con-
tained within it, involved a matter of paramount public import: the com-
mission, and investigation, of a violent crime which had been reported to 
authorities."121 A rape victim's name is clearly not a piece of informa-
tion relevant to the public's self-governing choices, which the Supreme 
Court has identified as the major underlying rationale for freedom of 
speech. 122 With a rape, the value of the news item is the rape's occur-
rence, the location of the crime, the assailant's identifying characteristics, 
and the status of the assailant's apprehension. This is the type of infor-
mation the public needs in order to evaluate the services provided by 
government, such as whether the community has appropriate safety 
measures in the crime area, whether the police force is performing its job 
effectively, or whether existing emergency procedures are adequate. 
Reporting the victim's name does nothing more than feed the public's 
curiosity. 
The media in Florida Star also argued that prohibiting disclosure of 
a rape victim's name would disable the press from providing the public 
119. Appellant's Brief at 12, Florida Star v. BJ.F., 491 U.S. 524 (1989) (No. 87-329). 
120. Id. (quoting Cox Broadcasting, 420 U.S. at 492). 
121. Florida Star, 491 U.S. at 536-37 (emphasis added). 
122. The Georgia State court made this point in its Cox Broadcasting opinion: "There is simply 
no public interest or general concern about the identity of the victim of such a crime as will make the 
right to disclose the identity of the victim rise to the level of First Amendment protection." Cox 
Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 231 Ga. 60, 68, 200 S.E.2d 127, 134 (1973), rev'd, 420 U.S. 469 (1975). 
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with the broader, truly important information society needs to govern 
itself. 123 And, in both Cox Broadcasting and Florida Star, the Court 
noted concern about whether a rule restricting the publication of certain 
truthful information would make it difficult for the media to inform citi-
zens about the public business and yet stay within the law. In Cox 
Broadcasting Justice White wrote, "The rule would invite timidity and 
self-censorship and very likely lead to the suppression of many items that 
would otherwise be published and that should be made available to the 
public."124 Justice Marshall in Florida Star stated, "[Such a rule] would 
force upon the media the onerous obligation of sifting through govern-
ment press releases, reports, and pronouncements to prune out material 
arguably unlawful for publication."125 · 
These pronouncements must be given great weight, but let us not 
lose sight of the issue before us. We are not suggesting that a nebulous 
concept be enacted into law that would require the media continually to 
analyze information to determine whether or not it was publishable. We 
are merely proposing a limitation on the disclosure of a rape victim's 
identity-an easily distinguishable piece of information. In addition, 
before it is determined that such a law would unreasonably restrain the 
media or that the media is incapable of restricting disclosure of a victim's 
name without harmful results, a review of current media practices is in 
order. 
The journalists' code of ethics and the policies of most members of 
the media currently prohibit publication of a rape victim's name. 126 No 
more than five to ten percent of newspapers routinely use rape victim's 
names. 127 In fact, the New York Times calls the policy "one of modern 
journalism's few <,;onspiracies of silence." 128 And even though a few 
members of the media, such as NBC News president Michael Gartner, 
123. Appellant's Brief at 17, Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524 (1989) (No. 87-329) ("The 
chilling effect on a free press and consequent constriction of the free flow of vital information about 
the government to its electorate are self-evident."). 
124. Cox Broadcasting, 420 U.S. at 496. 
125. Florida Star, 491 U.S. at 536. A March 30, 1991 reported rape involving a member of the 
Kennedy family in Pal~!~ Beach, Florida has generated new debate over the media's policy of not 
identifying rape victims. See, e.g., Frankel & Johnson, Media in Conflict on Naming Rape Victims, 
USA Today, Apr. 18, 1991, at 2A, col. 1; Kurtz, The Ethics of Identifying Rape Victims: NBC. NY 
Times Decision in Palm Beach Case Ignites Media Furor, Wash. Post, Apr. 18, 1991, at Al, col. 1. 
126. Jones, Naming Rape Victim is Still a Murky Issue for the Press, N.Y. Times, June 25, 1989, 
§ 1, at 18, col. 1. 
127. Id. 
128. I d. Still, a prohibition on publishing the name of the victim will not necessarily protect her 
identity. See for instance the angry letter to one Arizona newspaper concerning the paper's report-
ing of a recent sexual assault: 
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disagree with the policy because, as Gartner says, "it's not the job of the 
media to keep secrets,"129 the majority supports exercising such 
restraint. 13° Furthermore, it is doubtful many would argue that as a 
result of working within this established policy of not disclosing rape 
victims' names, members of the media have become more timid in their 
endeavor to investigate and report the news. From our vantage point, 
news reporters appear no less aggressive in pursuing their stories. Codi-
fying in a rule of law what is already the prevailing practice would not 
have a chilling effect on the media. 
Interestingly, in the time span between Cox Broadcasting and Flor-
ida Star, one member of the Supreme Court changed his views regarding 
the concerns of rape victims versus the burden such a disclosure rule 
would impose on the media. Justice White's majority opinion for the 
Court in Cox Broadcasting upheld the right of the media to publicize a 
rape victim's name without even a discussion of the harm to the victim. 
However, Justice White dissents in Florida Star stating, 
[I]t is not too much to ask the press, in instances such as this, to 
respect simple standards of decency and refrain from publishing a vic-
tim's name, address, and/or phone number. The Court's concern for a 
free press is appropriate, but such concerns should be balanced against 
rival interests in a civilized and humane society. 131 
... There is no public interest in publishing the names ... of persons 
who are the victims of crime .... 
Perhaps we should take heed from the Justice who started the Court 
down the path of curtailing rape victims' privacy rights with the Cox 
Broadcasting decision and now believes "we [have] hit the bottom of the 
slippery slope."132 Justice White maintains, and we agree, that a line can 
and should be drawn "higher on the hillside"133-high enough to protect 
Shame, shame, shame on The Arizona Daily Star, re: the report of a sexual assault, in the 
Metro Section of the June l edition. 
The article that I am referring to contained a description of the area where the victim 
was found, the block in which she lives and a detailed description of her vehicle. 
The only information the article did not contain was the victim's name and license 
plate number on her carl 
Anyone who lives in her area will know who this woman is now-thanks to your 
paper's "responsibility to report news." 
Surely an individual's right to privacy and confiderttiality outweighs the Star's free-
dom of speech. 
Ariz. Daily Star, June 9, 1990, §A, at 14. 
129. Kaplan & Leonard, supra note 56. 
130. Id. 
131. Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 547 & n.2, 553 (1989) (White J., dissenting). 
132. Id. at 553. 
133. Id. 
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the rape victim's privacy rights but at the same time not to interfere with 
the reporting of matters of legitimate public concern. The remaining fac-
tor to weigh in this analysis is one strongly emphasized by the Court in 
both Daily Mail and Florida Star-the states' interests in limiting disclo-
sure of rape victims' identities. 
VI. STATE INTERESTS 
In Florida Star, the Supreme Court conceded the "highly significant 
interests" of the state in limiting disclosure of a rape victim's name: "the 
privacy of victims of sexual offenses; the physical safety of such victims, 
who may be targeted for retaliation if their names become known to their 
assailants; and the goal of encouraging victims of such crimes to report 
these offenses without fear of exposure."134 
We now examine those interests to consider how important they 
really are. We have already discussed a number of privacy issues relating 
to victims of sexual offenses and the unique stigma attached to rape. 
Clinical research shows that high levels of fear and anxiety dominate the 
victim's psychological state and behavior immediately after the rape. 135 
During this period, each victim is forced to make many personal choices 
about how to contend with the effects of the assault as they impact both 
her and those around her in home, work, and social environments. Exac-
erbating this situation is the question of pregnancy or AIDS resulting 
from the rape. A victim's apprehension about such possible conse-
quences can add even more trauma to that which she has already sus-
tained. As stated by Carolyn Holmes, a psychologist at the University of 
Texas Medical School, "AIDS has made rape an even more frightening 
and traumatic experience. . . . There has always been a concern about 
venereal disease, but now [the victim's] life is involved."136 It is hard to 
imagine issues more private than those facing a victim who has become 
pregnant or contracted AIDS from a rapist. A decision whether or not 
to terminate the pregnancy may raise psychological, legal, and religious 
concerns for the victim. With AIDS, the mere fear of exposure to the 
disease can make a victim's healing process more difficult as she worries 
about resuming a normal sex life, becoming pregnant, or falling fatally 
ill. If the victim has contracted AIDS from the rapist, the result will 
134. Florida Star, 491 U.S. at 537 (citing Brief for Appellee at 29-30). 
135. Sexual Assault Research Project, supra note 59, at 20-24. 
136. Salholz, A Frightening Aftermath, NEWSWEEK, July 23, 1990, at 53. 
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obviously be devastating and life threatening. 137 To expose a person's 
identity without her consent strips these private and personal decisions 
away from her and places them in the hands of a remote stranger. Such 
an action can only slow the victim's healing process, a process the state 
has a significant interest in protecting. 
The state's interest in the physical safety of rape victims is also of 
the highest order. The facts in Florida Star provide a vivid example of 
the dangerous consequences that disclosing a victim's name may possibly 
have, particularly when the assailant is still at large. Here the victim's 
name was published within days of her assault. While she was still hospi-
talized, her mother received several telephone calls from a man who 
stated that he would rape the victim again. The plaintiff was forced to 
change her telephone number, seek police protection, and eventually 
change her residence. Publication of the rape victim's name subjected 
her to harassment and threats by the rapist or others. It is not inconceiv-
able that such a publication could also enable the assailant to locate and 
further harm the victim, knowing she is capable of identifying him and 
assisting in his apprehension. Even in cases where the assailant has been 
apprehended and retaliation is not a threat, publicizing the victim's name 
just after the crime can plant an idea in a potential criminal's mind that 
the victim is a vulnerable target. In fact, it is unknown whether the man 
who made the threatening phone calls in Florida Star was the actual rap-
ist or another person. Thus, the possibility that publicizing a victim's 
name can create another crime is a very real one. 
Finally, the state's interest in assisting rape victims and encouraging 
them to report their rapes is paramount if the state is to compile more 
accurate statistics on the severity and frequency of the crime, and if it is 
to more readily obtain evidence for prosecuting rapists. Frightening sta-
tistics already show that during the past ten years rape rates have risen 
nearly four times as fast as the total crime rate, that every hour sixteen 
American women confront rapists, and that every six minutes a woman 
is raped. 138 Astounding as these figures are, rape remains the most 
137. In addition to the life-threatening impact of AIDS, a victim can be snbjected to a stressful 
situation if she decides to raise the AIDS issue at trial. "If a woman claims she got AIDS from [the 
rapist], it will open the door to examining her entire sexual history. . .. The defense would attempt 
to prove she could have gotten it from somebody else." Id. (quoting sociologist Pauline Bart, co-
author of Stopping Rape: Successful Survival Strategies). "AIDS is so insidious. . .. It serves as a 
good metaphor for the sexual trauma of rape." Id. (quoting Eugene Porter, an Oklahoma 
psychologist). 
138. Hearings on Women and Violence, supra note 63, Part 1 at 12 (data compiled by the major-
ity staff of the Senate Judicary Committee). 
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underreported crime within the criminal justice system.D9 In 1988, 
92,486 rapes were reported to the authorities, yet the FBI estimates 
actual rapes could total over 900,000 a year. 140 One reason frequently 
mentioned by victims who do not report their rapes to the police is their 
uncertainty about whether they will be able to maintain their privacy if 
they do report the rape. 141 They want control over when and to whom 
they will reveal the details of their tragedy. Knowing of the severity of 
the situation, the state has a substantial and tangible interest in guaran-
teeing a victim's anonymity in order to encourage reporting of rapes. If 
victims knew anonymity would be guaranteed when they reported a rape 
and knew that a civil cause of action would be available for violations of 
that guarantee, the number of victims who would come forward would 
likely increase. Conversely, if states do not take such protective measures 
and victims know their names could be made public, the result would 
likely be a decrease in the already low reporting rate. 
In Florida Star the Supreme Court specifically noted the possible 
necessity of imposing civil sanctions for the publication of a rape victim's 
name in order to advance these significant state interests, but only when 
sanctions are in the confines of a narrowly tailored statute. 142 Several 
important drafting issues must be confronted before such a comprehen-
sive statute can be successfully enacted. 
VII. A COMPREHENSIVE STATUTE 
A. DRAFfiNG IsSUES 
Repeatedly, the Supreme Court has made clear that a state may reg-
ulate media reporting only if it shows that the interests promoted are 
truly of the highest order. As indicated above, Justice Marshall in Flor-
ida Star recognized that such a showing can be made as to the limitation 
of the disclosure of rape victims.143 However, it is not enough that the 
state's interest be of a high order. This is but the first requirement; the 
139. Id. at 51 (statement of Linda Fairstein, Assistant District Attorney, New York County). 
140. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 1988 FBI UNIFORM CRIME REPORT, NATIONAL CRIME 
SURVEY. The Aprill7, 1991 USA Today poll found that 46% of women said if raped, they would be 
Jess likely to report it if they knew their names would become public. Sanchez, supra note 68. 
According to Kris Kama of the Palm Beach County Sexual Assault Program, as a consequence of 
the publicity received by the rape case in Palm Beach, victims are already calling the crisis center, 
confused about whether they should report rapes. "We're afraid of the setback it's going to have," 
says Kama. Keen & Pesce, Publicity Worries Counselors, USA Today, Apr. 18, 1991, at 2A, col. 1. 
141. Biele, supra note 55, at SA, col. 5. 
142. Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 540-41 (1989). 
143. Id. at 536-37; see supra note 134 and accompanying text. 
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state must also show that in order to promote these interests, it has taken 
steps to ensure that it intends to keep the matter private. Hence, broad-
based disclosure by government officials will undoubtedly refute the 
state's assertion that these interests are among the state's highest 
priorities. 144 
At least six Justices of the Supreme Court were troubled by the 
underinclusive nature of the prohibition in Florida Star. As Justice 
Scalia put it, "[A] law cannot be regarded as protecting an interest 'of the 
highest order' and thus as justifying a restriction upon truthful speech, 
when it leaves appreciable damage to that supposedly vital interest 
unprohibited."145 For Justice Scalia and the majority Justices, this 
appreciable damage was caused by communication of the rape victim's 
identity by those other than the media. Therefore, before a prohibitive 
statute in this area will be approved the law must presumably extend to 
all those who disseminate the information. 146 A valid statute must 
explicitly recognize potential liability for those outside of the communi-
cations industry. 
The majority of the Florida Star Court was also greatly concerned 
with the Florida court's willingness to allow a judgment on a judicial 
finding of "negligence per se." Justice Marshall commented that there 
was no requirement of a specific determination as to the defendant's cul-
pable state of mind. Such a failure, he wrote, would allow recovery even 
when essentially no damage was done, such as when "the identity of the 
victim is already known throughout the community; [when] the victim 
has voluntarily called public attention to the offense; or [when] the iden-
tity of the victim has otherwise become a reasonable subject of public 
concem."147 It is vital, then, for a statute to include a stringent state of 
mind requirement with respect to both the publication of the information 
and the likely impact of such publication. 
144. See, for example, the relatively easy conclusions reached by the Court in cases such as 
Oklahoma Publishing Co. v. District Court, 430 U.S. 308 (1977), where the judge allowed reporters 
into the courtroom to hear the information but then attempted to prohibit them from reporting on 
the proceedings which they had observed. Indeed, in both Cox Broadcasting and in Florida Star the 
information was made readily available to reporters with limited investigation on their part. 
145. Florida Star, 491 U.S. at 540 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Smith v. Daily Mail Publish-
ing Co., 443 U.S. 97, 103 (1979)). 
146. It is not entirely clear why the concern as to underinclusiveness was so great in the major-
ity and concurring opinions. That is, why could not the legislature determine that mass media 
communication is a much greater problem or that dealing with that particular problem was a neces-
sary first step in combating a statewide issue? In addition, as Justice White stated, the state may 
already have felt it covered private dissemination in the tort action for public disclosure of private 
facts. /d. at 549-50 (White, J., dissenting). 
147. Florida Star, 491 U.S. at 539. 
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Finally, an unstated but clearly present concern of the Justices 
related to the implied right of action in both Florida Star and Cox Broad-
casting. That is, in both cases a criminal statute was at issue and the trial 
courts attempted to determine whether the state tort law allowed for 
recovery in this area or whether such an action could be implied from the 
criminal violation. To set out clearly the appropriate balance of privacy 
and first amendment interests, a specific cause of action should be created 
by the legislature. 
B. THE STATUTE 
LIMITING DISCLOSURE OF RAPE VICTIMS' IDENTITIES 
Preamble: It shall be the policy of this state to make every effort to 
limit the disclosure of the names or other identifying information con-
cerning victims of sexual assaults. This policy is adopted in order to pro-
tect the privacy and the safety of victims of sexual assaults and to 
encourage victims of such crimes to report these offenses without fear of 
exposure. To promote this policy the state creates the following civil 
right of action. 
Any entity or individual who communicates to others,. prior to open 
judicial proceedings, the name, address, phone number, or other specific 
identifying information concerning the victim of a sexual assault shall be 
liable to that victim for all damages reasonably necessary to compensate 
the victim for any injuries suffered as a result of such communication. 
The victim shall not be able to maintain a right of action unless she is 
able to show, by clear and convincing evidence, that such communication 
was intentional and was done with reckless disregard for the highly offen-
sive nature of the publication. Punitive damages shall not be awarded in 
an action brought pursuant to this section. 
C. COMMENTARY 
The preamble to the statute makes clear that the purposes behind 
the statute are of the highest order. That these purposes are genuinely of 
the highest order was expressly recognized by the Court in Florida Star. 
Disappointingly, however, the opinion by the Florida state court made 
no reference either to these interests or to the limited intrusion on first 
amendment values which would result if restrictions on the disclosure of 
sexual assault victims' identities were pursued. 148 The preamble also 
148. There is absolutely no analysis of either the first amendment interest or of the privacy 
interest. Instead, the court simply concludes that a rape victim's name is "of a private nature and 
1991] LIMITING DISCLOSURE 1053 
states the need to limit disclosure of victims' identities, a policy which 
the state of Florida had thought it was pursuing in Florida Star. The 
Florida Attorney General had opined that "the name or other identifying 
information concerning victims of sexual assaults is not part of an open 
public record and may not be publicly disclosed in any manner by the 
custodian of such records." 149 
The statute expressly creates a civil right of action while making no 
reference to criminal proceedings. The initiation of criminal proceedings 
in this area creates severe difficulties. 150 The Supreme Court itself, in 
referring to the kind of law which might survive constitutional scrutiny, 
specified "civil sanctions."151 The statute imposes liability for any indi-
vidual or entity publishing the information; of course, this is an attempt 
to avoid the "underinclusive" arguments put forth by both the majority 
and concurring opinions in Florida Star. This statute also is limited to 
disclosures that occur prior to open judicial proceedings. Normally some 
sort of protective order can occur at the trial to limit disclosure. 152 Fur-
thermore, in most cases the troubling disclosure occurs prior to open 
judicial proceedings. 153 Moreover, limiting the statute's application to 
disclosure prior to open judicial proceedings lessens the first amendment 
impact here, an impact of great significance in Cox Broadcasting. If 
reporters are writing of open judicial proceedings involving major state 
crimes, it is highly doubtful that disclosure could routinely be limited 
and ultimately punished. 154 
The cause of action created under this statute is limited to the victim 
whose identity is disclosed. A case such as Cox Broadcasting-where the 
plaintiff was a member of the victim's family--could not be brought 
under this law. We believe this is an appropriate limitation because 
not to be published as a matter oflaw." Florida Star v. B.J.F., 499 So. 2d 883, 884 (Fla. 1986), rev'd, 
491 U.S. 524 (1989). For a thoughtful discussion of the purposes of the state in preventing disclo-
sure as well as the first amendment interest in being allowed to publish truthful information, see Doe 
v. Sarasota-Bradenton Fla. Television Co., 436 So. 2d 328 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983). 
149. 1975 Op. Att'y. Gen. Fla. 075-203 (July 14, 1975). 
150. See Marcus, supra note 45, at 271-73. 
151. Florida Star, 491 U.S. at 537. 
152. The Florida court in Sarasota-Bradenton made specific reference to the state's ability to 
seek a protective order to ensure that the victim's name and photograph not be published. 436 So. 
2d at 331. 
153. But see Sarasota-Bradenton, 436 So.2d at 329-30, where the television station ran a video-
"tape of the rape trial and the victim's name and picture ~ere broadcast to the viewing audience. This 
oceurred even though Jaw enforcement authorities had assured the victim that such disclosure would 
not take place. 
154. See Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 492 (1975). The opinion in Cox Broad-
casting reflected the special protection given to reports of judicial proceedings. 
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undoubtedly it is the victim who suffers the most from disclosure. More-
over, it is difficult to know where to draw the line if persons other than 
the victim can bring an action. Spouses, live-in companions, children, 
parents, and close friends could all have legitimate claims. 
No effort is made to define the compensatory damages that would be 
present in this statute. We assume that the common law principles found 
throughout the United States can deal with the question in much the 
same way it has been dealt with in both privacy and defamation actions 
for the last twenty-five years. The grave difficulties that would be created 
by punitive damages 155 are eliminated here because punitive damages are 
explicitly unavailable. 
The burden of proof and the requisite states of mind create perhaps 
the most significant problems in this area. We have adopted the "clear 
and convincing" evidence standard from the Supreme Court's line of def-
amation cases. 156 Such a standard effectively balances first amendment 
concerns against the interests of individuals. Unless the individual can 
maintain such a high degree of proof, it is not clear that she ought to be 
able to prevail in connection with the disclosure of truthful information. 
As to the states of mind required here, it is a two-pronged procedure. 
First, the cause of action rests upon a showing of intentional publication. 
A mere misstatement or a negligent disclosure would be insufficient to 
subject a publisher to liability. Second, the reckless disregard standard, 
borrowed from New York Times v. Sullivan, is applied to the degree of 
offensiveness present in the case. This is a direct link to Justice Mar-
shall's own concern over a lack of scienter in Florida Star 157 and may be 
traced to a line of state cases attempting to balance truthful disclosure 
with privacy interests. 158 
155. See supra note 23. 
156. See, e.g., Getz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 331-32 (1974). 
157. Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 539 (1989). 
158. See, e.g., Briscoe v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 4 Cal. 3d 529, 483 P.2d 34, 93 Cal. Rptr. 866 
(1971), where Readers Digest pnblished an article specifically mentioning the name of an individual 
who had been convicted of a crime many years before and had thereafter become rehabilitated. In 
attempting to balance both the privacy and first amendment concerns the California Supreme Court 
remanded the case to the trial court to decide the following: 
1) [W]hether plaintiff had become a rehabilitated member of society, 2) whether iden· 
tifying him as a former criminal would be highly offensive and injurious to the reasonable 
man, 3) whether defendant published this information with a reckless disregard for its 
offensiveness, and 4) whether any independent justification for printing plaintiff's identity 
existed. 
/d. at 543, 483 P.2d at 44, 93 Cal. Rptr. at 876. 
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VIII. CONCLUSION 
The disclosure of the identity of a rape victim prior to trial is an 
outrageous and shocking penalty imposed on a woman already brutal-
ized by a violent and terrorizing crime. As the supervisor of a family 
violence center recently noted, "[Disclosure] would be the worst thing in 
the world you could do to a victim. It is the most crucial time in that 
person's life."159 Conversely, the impact that disclosure limitations will 
have on freedom of the press have been widely overstated. Imposing nar-
rowly drawn restrictions will not severely inhibit the media or unduly 
limit the public's right to know. What such restrictions will do, however, 
is provide significant protection to victims of a horrible crime and 
encourage these victims and witnesses to come forth and become 
involved in the prosecution of these crimes. The statute we propose here 
carefully balances the interests that the Supreme Court has confronted 
for over two decades. We believe states should enact it into law. 
159. Worthington, supra note 3 (quoting Dee Ann Wolfe, supervisor of the Family Violence 
Center in Des Moines). 
